Excessive privileges are a major concern for today’s security teams. Attackers frequently exploit over-permissioned accounts using stolen credentials or other techniques. Once inside a network, they move laterally, using excessive privileges to exfiltrate data, disrupt critical applications and services, and carry out other malicious activities.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework documents how attackers consistently leverage compromised credentials to gain privileged access to sensitive systems and traverse networks. Similarly, the 2025 OWASP Non-Human Identities Top 10 identifies overprivileged machine identities as a significant risk.
According to a 2026 Delinea Identity Security Report, 73% of organizations agree that standing access for non-human identities (NHIs) and AI agents increases risk. And 38% of organizations say excessive autonomy or privilege is their top concern related to AI agents and other NHIs.
Leading cybersecurity authorities like the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have long recommended organizations adopt the principle of least privilege (PoLP) to reduce the attack surface, limit lateral movement and contain the impact of compromised credentials.
A widely publicized 2024 Snowflake data breach shows exactly what can happen when these recommendations go unheeded. Attackers used stolen credentials, some dating back to 2020, to access the Snowflake environments of approximately 165 customers. Those credentials had never been rotated. The permissions attached to those accounts gave attackers unrestricted access to confidential data. Least privilege enforcement, specifically scoped permissions and credential rotation, could have significantly limited the blast radius of this attack.
No organization creates over-permissioned accounts intentionally. Privilege creep builds up gradually as users change roles and projects evolve. An employee may move to a new team but retain permissions from their previous position. Months later, nobody remembers those permissions still exist. A contractor completes a project but keeps access to the systems they no longer use.
Over time, users, applications, service accounts and AI agents can accumulate privileges far beyond what they need. AI agents created by other agents “inherit” their privileges whether or not they actually need that level of access. Every over-permissioned account creates another opportunity for an attacker.
The principle of least privilege was originally applied to people, but in modern IT environments, NHIs far outnumber their human counterparts. Machine identities often pose greater risk than over-permissioned human accounts because they are created programmatically, granted broad access during deployment and rarely reviewed afterward.
AI agents raise the stakes even further. A single agent with excessive permissions can move across multiple systems at machine speed, spreading damage faster than security teams can detect and respond.
No cybersecurity program is foolproof. Users will fall for phishing attacks. Credentials will be stolen. Attackers will eventually get in. Least privilege controls what they can do once they're inside.
The principle of least privilege limits the damage by restricting every identity to only the systems, resources and actions required for its particular role. By eliminating unnecessary access, organizations reduce a threat actor’s ability to move laterally, elevate privileges and expand the scope of an attack.
Least privilege access is a set of identity security practices, policies and enforcement mechanisms that removes unnecessary permissions and mitigates risk. It involves determining what access each identity requires, granting only those permissions and continuously adjusting permissions as business needs change.

The first step in implementing least privilege access is determining the minimum permissions an identity needs. A developer may require access to source code repositories and development environments but not production systems. A database administrator (DBA) may require administrative access to database infrastructure but not to other IT systems. An AI agent may be authorized to retrieve customer information from a CRM system but not modify it.
Once requirements are understood, permissions are granted. Many organizations use role-based access controls to simplify this process for human identities. Rather than assigning permissions individually, users are placed into predefined roles that provide access to the resources required for that position.
Deciding who gets access is only part of the equation. Least privilege also controls what those identities are allowed to do once they're inside. Some users only need permission to view records. Others may need to update them. By restricting permissions to specific actions, organizations reduce opportunities for both accidental misuse and intentional abuse.
Least privilege access is a foundational principle that underpins many modern identity security solutions and practices. Each approach enforces least privilege in a different way, but they all ensure a human or an NHI is granted only the minimum permissions necessary to perform its function.
Solution/concept |
Function |
Agentic AI security value add |
Just-in-time (JIT) access |
An identity security capability that grants access only when needed and revokes it automatically when the task is complete. | JIT access adds a time dimension to least privilege, granting permissions only for the duration of a specific task. |
Privileged Access Management (PAM) |
Governs how privileged identities access sensitive systems, with credential vaulting, session management and auditing. | PAM puts least privilege into practice by restricting, securing and logging access to privileged accounts. |
Privilege elevation and delegation management (PEDM) |
Allows end-users to temporarily elevate privileges for specific tasks or applications without holding permanent admin rights. | PEDM applies least privilege at the endpoint, letting users invoke elevated permissions for specific functions like installing software. |
Role-based access control (RBAC) |
Assigns permissions to groups of users rather than individuals. | RBAC enforces least privilege by grouping users into roles that reflect what their job function requires, rather than assigning permissions individually. |
Zero trust |
A security model built on the principle of never trust always verify, where every access request is evaluated on its own merits. | Least privilege complements zero trust by defining what a verified identity is permitted to do once access has been granted. |
Zero standing privilege (ZSP) |
The principle that no identity, human or machine, should hold persistent privileged access to any system. | Least privilege defines the scope of access. Zero standing privilege ensures that access is not permanent. |